[BA] Authentication of GNSS-based Communication

  • Tagung:

    Authentication of GNSS-based Communication

  • Tagungsort:

    Geb. 50.34, Raum 252 oder online https://i62bbb.tm.kit.edu/b/mic-7xx-rfr

  • Datum:

    2024-07-23

  • Autoren:

    Lukas Zetto

  • Zeit:

    16:15

  • With the continuous growth of our dependence on GNSS in consumer, industrial, and military applications, such systems have also become a popular target for attacks. If successful, these could have catastrophic effects – especially when critical infrastructure is affected – or induce huge financial losses if for e.g. commercial shipping and aviation are hindered. To combat spoofing attacks, where false signals are created to imitate those of GNSS satellites, cryptographic authentication of the signals seems like a natural solution. However, due to the specific circumstances of communication between satellites and receivers, such authentication methods have to adhere to certain requirements. We take a close look at OSNMA, the first publicly accessible authenticated GNSS system, which has recently been released. Then we will establish how well different approaches perform in terms of security, bandwidth requirements, robustness, efficiency, scalability, as well as memory and computational costs.